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To What Extent Can Congress Change the
Patent Right Without Effecting a Taking?
by JESSE S. CHUI*
I. Introduction
The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to "promote
the.., useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their... Discoveries."1  Since the Patent Act of
1790, Congress has continued to define and redefine the metes and
bounds of the patent right. This tradition continues with the Patent
Reform Act of 2005, introduced in the House of Representatives on
June 8, 2005.2
A patent gives the patent holder the right to prevent others from
making, using, selling, offering to sell, and importing the protected
invention.3 A patent does not affirmatively allow the patentee a right
to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import the invention; it only grants
the patentee the right to exclude others from doing so.4
A patent, as an intellectual property right, exhibits most of the
attributes that comprise the "bundle of sticks" of real property rights.
Scholars disagree about all the rights included in the bundle, but the
most commonly identified "sticks" include the right to exclude others,
the right to possess, the right to use, and the right to alienate (i.e., to
dispose of or transfer).5 The Supreme Court has called the right to
* J.D. candidate, May 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
Computer Science, 2003, University of California, Berkeley. Special thanks to Professor
Robin Feldman, Professor Jeffrey A, Lefstin, Professor Calvin R. Massey, and Isaac Fong
for their guidance and insights.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
3. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2005).
4. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947, 949-50 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
5. Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 285-286 (2002).
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exclude others "[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest, 6 and
"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property., 7 Like a land deed, a patent
defines the boundaries of the invention's "intellectual territory" and
allows the patent holder to sue those who "trespass" upon the
property.
The U.S. patent system flows from the Constitution, which grants
Congress the power to confer patents.' Since the ratification of the
Constitution, Congress has enacted a number of statutes,9 including
six Patent Acts," that have in whole or in part modified the patent
right.
Although "the Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away,"'"
Congress cannot take away too much of the patent right without
effecting a taking. The Takings Clause, which "presupposes the
government's authority to acquire private property for public use,,"'2
provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation."" It does not prohibit takings, but merely
requires the government to provide just compensation when one has
occurred. 4 It is important to note that when the Supreme Court
characterizes governmental regulation as a valid exercise of the police
power to reduce or eliminate a nuisance or social harm, no taking has
occurred."
6. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673 (1999).
7. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
9. See, e.g., the Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2005) (preventing
patents from issuing on inventions whose publication "might... be detrimental to the
national security"); the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2181(a), (b) (West 2005)
(preventing patents from issuing on inventions "useful solely ... in an atomic weapon"
and revoking "[a]ny patent granted for any such invention"); the Atomic Energy Act at
§§ 2183(c), (g) (requiring patentees to license atomic energy inventions); the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7608 (West 2005) (requiring patentees to license air pollution control
inventions); the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2404 (West 2005) (requiring
patentees to license new varieties of sexually reproduced plants).
10. The Patent Act of 1790; the Patent Act of 1793;, the Patent Act of 1836;, the
Patent Act of 1839; the Patent Act of 1870; and the Patent Act of 1952.
11. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp.
51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973) (referring to federal jurisdiction).
12. DOUGLAS T. KENDALL, ET AL, TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK 3 (2000).
13. U.S. CONST. amend V.
14. First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
15. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)
(upholding statute authorizing forfeiture of a vessel used to transport marijuana); Miller v.
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When Congress limits the patent right, it usually does so in one
of three ways: it authorizes compulsory licensing,'6 redefines
patentable subject matter, 7 or exempts enumerated classes from
patent infringement. Such legislation may constrict the patent right
to the point that it becomes a taking. This note examines takings law
and the three primary ways Congress modifies the patent right
(authorizing compulsory licensing, redefining patentable subject
matter, and exempting certain classes from patent infringement). The




In takings jurisprudence, the issue of just compensation is not as
controversial as the two issues of (1) public use and (2) the point at
which regulations become takings.' 9  The first requirement the
government must meet in order to constitutionally take property is
the "public use" requirement. The government may not
constitutionally take property for private use-a governmental action
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding statute authorizing the uncompensated
destruction of red cedar trees in order to protect apple trees from "cedar rust" fungus);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning prohibiting
apartments as a valid exercise of police power); Reiman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171 (1915) (upholding municipal ordinance prohibiting livery stables as a valid exercise of
police power); Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (upholding
regulation requiring railroads to maintain railroad crossing facilities and watchmen as a
valid exercise of police power); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020-
26 (1992) (discussing the Court's "background principles" inquiry into nuisance law).
16. See, e.g., the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2183(c), (g) (West 2005)
(requiring patentees to license atomic energy inventions); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7608 (West 2005) (requiring patentees to license air pollution control inventions); the
Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2404 (West 2005) (requiring patentees to
license new varieties of sexually reproduced plants).
17. See, e.g., the Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2005) (preventing
patents from issuing on inventions whose publication "might... be detrimental to the
national security"); the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2181(a), (b) (West 2005)
(preventing patents from issuing on inventions "useful solely.., in an atomic weapon"
and revoking "any patent granted for such invention").
18. See, e.g., the Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (West 2005) (providing
that acts that are "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates... drugs or veterinary biological
products" are not infringing).
19. CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND
LIBERTIES 557-58, 562 (2d ed. 2005).
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usually modeled as a forcible transfer of property from one private
person to another-no matter how it compensates the property
owner.
B. Public Use
The Supreme Court's most recent definition of the public use
requirement arrived via Kelo v. City of New London.' Justice
Stevens, writing for the five-Justice majority, declared that the public
use requirement of the takings clause is satisfied when the
governmental action "serves a public purpose,"21 and held that the
government's plan for economic development "unquestionably"
served a public purpose, thereby satisfying the public use
requirement . In its analysis, the majority emphasized the Court's
"traditionally broad understanding of public purpose" 23 and its
deference to legislative determinations that an act of government
serves a public purpose 4.2  The majority criticized the "substantially
advances" formula used in regulatory takings doctrine and set forth
rational basis review as the proper standard for a public use inquiry. 5
Any bill enacted by Congress that limits the patent right will
almost certainly meet the public use requirement of the takings
clause. Given the Supreme Court's latest determination of the public
use requirement, any Congressional act that mentions or attempts
some non-arbitrary public purpose will satisfy the public use
requirement. One professor recently wrote that, after Kelo, "[t]he
federal bar [for public use] is presently set so low as to be little more
than a speed bump.
2 16
C. Three Categories of Takings Claims
There are three categories of takings claims: (1) permanent
physical occupations, (2) conditions on development permits, and (3)
regulatory takings. A permanent physical occupation occurs when
the government permanently occupies or invades all or a portion of a
piece of private property, or confiscates personal property. A
20. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
21. Id. at 484.
22. Id. at 470.
23. Id. at 485.
24. Id. at 480.
25. Id. at 488.
26. David L. Callies, A Requiem for Public Use, 20 PROBATE AND PROPERTY 12
(2006).
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condition on a development permit occurs when the government
conditions the grant of a building permit on a dedication from the
property owner (e.g., an easement). A regulatory taking is a "catch-
all" government action that involves neither physical invasion nor
conditional permits.
1. Permanent Physical Occupations
Since the first successful Supreme Court takings case in 1872,27
the Supreme Court has found takings in numerous physical invasion
cases' but has found far fewer takings in regulatory takings cases.
Permanent physical occupations and invasions violate the owner's
right to exclude others-"universally held to be a fundamental
element of the property right" 29-and so are per se takings "to the
extent of the occupation."' The governmental action must constitute
a permanent occupation to be considered a per se taking.3' Justice
Stevens compared the Court's treatment of physical occupations to its
treatment of other types of takings:
"Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical
takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the
straightforward application of per se rules. Our regulatory takings
jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is
characterized by 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,' designed to
allow 'careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances."
32
In the leading Supreme Court case on permanent physical
occupations, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp., the
Court held that a New York statute requiring apartment owner Jean
Loretto to allow a cable television company to install cables on her
property was a taking because it constituted a "permanent physical
occupation" of her property.33 In its analysis, the Court stated that
the owner's "power to exclude has traditionally been considered one
27. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872).
28. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1982).
29. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
30. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
31. Id. at 436, n.12 (distinguishing temporary physical occupations, which "are subject
to a more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking," from
permanent physical occupations, which are takings per se).
32. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash,, 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concuring)).
33. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421,441.
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of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property
rights." 3 The Court noted that "an owner suffers a special kind of
injury when a stranger invades and occupies the owner's property,"35
and that such an invasion "is qualitatively more intrusive than
perhaps any other category of property regulation., 36 "In light of our
analysis," concluded the Court, the statutorily-mandated cable
installation "permanently appropriate[s] appellant's property.
Accordingly,... [the] installation is a taking."37
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court would apply the
permanent physical occupation rule to permanent occupation of
intellectual property such as patents; however, the Court was quite
broad in outlining the scope of its permanent physical occupation
rule: "We fail to see, however, why a physical occupation of one type
of property but not another type is any less a physical occupation."38
In addition, one of the purposes of the rule-namely, the Court's
desire to protect the "treasured strand" of the right to exclude-
applies to intellectual property as readily as it does to real property.
The Supreme Court has found a taking when constructive rather
than actual permanent physical occupation existed. In United States v.
Causby, the Court found that the governmental action at issue
constituted a constructive permanent physical occupation. 9  In
Causby, government "bombers, transports and fighters" continually
took off and landed over Tommy Lee Causby's land.4° The owner's
home and "various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising
chickens" were situated on the land.4' The Court held that "there was
an invasion of respondents' property, 42 for two reasons: (1) "[T]he
flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as
much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional
entry upon it"'43 and (2) under the facts of the case, which included the
death of 150 chickens and sleep deprivation, nervousness, and fright,
the Court found that flights over the land were "so low and so
34. Id. at 435 (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80).
35. Id. at 420 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 441.
37. Id. at 438.
38. Id. at 439.
39. 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see also Massey, supra note 19, at 576.
40. Causby, 328 U.S. at 259.
41. Id. at 258.
42. Id. at 266.
43. Id. at 264.
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frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land.""
On the one hand, the Causby Court applied its permanent
physical occupation takings analysis to airspace and not land; on the
other hand, the decision repeatedly tied the effect of the
governmental action to the property owner's "enjoyment and use of
the land" (emphasis added)." Nonetheless, the Court's taking
decisions are predicated on protecting the bundle of sticks that
comprise property rights and when property rights have been denied
or destroyed, the Court will consider whether a taking has occurred.
Babbitt v. Youpee and Hodel v. Irving demonstrate that government
regulation that abrogates the right to convey property can effect a
taking.46 Causby demonstrates that governmental action that reduces
the right to "enjoy[] and use"47 property can effect a taking. Loretto
demonstrates that governmental action that abridges the right to
exclude can effect a taking. The Court's motivations in its takings
jurisprudence suggest that it might be willing to find a constructive
permanent physical occupation of a patent.
Furthermore, while a patent does not have physical borders, it is
similar to a real property deed because the claims in a patent set out
the "metes and bounds" of the intellectual property rights conferred
by the patent." In addition, the patent right consists primarily of the
"treasured strand" of the right to exclude, 9 a right granted by a real
property deed.
Patent holders have the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering to sell, selling or importing into the United States the
invention described in the patent claims.0 The patent holder may sue
to enjoin infringement by "trespassers" who exploit the patented
invention without authorization.5' A patent does not affirmatively
allow its owner to exploit the patented product on the marketplace.52
44. Id. at 266.
45. Id. See also id. at 261 ("If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights,
respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete.").
46. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 236-42 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 706-
10 (1987).
47. Causby, 328 U.S. at 266.
48. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitoto Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
49. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
50. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a).
51. See e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. 253 (West 2005).
52. 35 U.S.C.A. § 721(a) (West 2005).
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The greatest value, if not the entire value, of a patent lies in the right
to exclude that it confers to the patent holder. "[W]ithout the right to
exclude 'the express purpose of the Constitution and Congress, to
promote the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously
undermined."'
5 3
Infringement of a patent is therefore strongly analogous to
physical occupation of real property: Both violate the property
owner's right to exclude by abrogating one of the sticks in the bundle
of property rights. Any regulation that allows patent infringement
amounts to a "physical occupation" of the patent, any regulation that
does so permanently falls under the "permanent physical occupation"
rule, and permanent physical occupation of property by the
government effects a taking.
2. Conditions on Development Permits
Almost all conditions on development permits cases follow the
same fact pattern: A property owner wishes to develop her property;
the government finds that the property owner's proposed
development causes or exacerbates a problem; consequently, the
government demands land (i.e., requires a dedication of land) from
her or forbids her from realizing her proposed development,
ostensibly as a means to offset the problem or mitigate it.
The Supreme Court has created two tests to determine whether a
required dedication constitutes a taking: the essential nexus test from
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission-4 and the rough
proportionality test from Dolan v. City of Tigard.55 Under the
essential nexus test, the government must show the existence of an
"essential nexus" between the stated legitimate state interest and the
required dedication. 6 Under the roughly proportionality test, the
government must show that the required dedication is "roughly
proportional" to the problem created by the development. 7 Only
when a challenged government regulation satisfies both tests will a
court consider it to not be a taking.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the California
Coastal Commission conditioned a building permit on the grant of
53. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Smith
Internat'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
54. 483 U.S. 825,837 (1987).
55. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
56. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
57. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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public lateral beachfront access across the Nollans' property (i.e., an
easement to pass across their property), ostensibly to preserve "the
public's ability to see the beach. 5 ' The majority, led by Justice Scalia,
stated:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that
people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the
Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach
created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand
how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public
beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on
them caused by construction of the Nollans' new house.59
Because the Court found that people already walking on the
beach had an unobstructed view of the beach, it found that the
required dedication failed the essential nexus test.6° The majority
then concluded that the Commission's requirement was a taking:
"California is free to advance its 'comprehensive program,' if it
wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this 'public
purpose,' but if it wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it
must pay for it."
61
In Dolan v. City of Tigard, Mrs. Dolan wished to double the size
of her plumbing and electric supply store and pave the store's gravel
parking lot.62 The City of Tigard conditioned the grant of a building
permit on (1) a public greenway intended to minimize flooding that
would have been exacerbated by the increases in water-impermeable
surfaces associated with her development and (2) a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway intended to relieve traffic congestion.63  Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined that "a nexus
exist[ed] between preventing flooding.., and limiting development"
and between "the city's attempt to reduce traffic congestion" and the
pedestrian bicycle/pathway such that the City of Tigard satisfied the
essential nexus test.64 Nevertheless, the majority found that the city's
two requirements were not "roughly proportional" to its goals, since
the city "never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private
one, was required in the interest of flood control, 6' and failed to meet
58. No~lan, 483 U.S. at 835.
59. Id. at 838-39.
60. Id. at 838.
61. Id. at 841-42 (citations omitted).
62. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379, 387.
63. Id. at 378.
64. Id. at 387-88.
65. Id. at 393.
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"its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle
and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's development reasonably
relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement., 66  Regarding the rough
proportionality test, the Court stressed, "No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some effort to quantify
its findings in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle
pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of
the traffic demand generated.,
67
To date, Supreme Court cases in this area have only involved
challenges to required dedications of land.6' In addition, since "the
essential nexus test applies only to conditions placed on the
government's granting of a discretionary permit,"69 the Nollan and
Dolan tests most likely do not apply to patents. A patent is not a
discretionary permit-it "'is a right and not a matter of grace or
favor.' 70 The building permits sought by the plaintiffs in Nollan and
Dolan were discretionary permits. In addition, "[a] regulation that is
constitutional as part of a conditional permit might violate the Fifth
Amendment [i.e., it might effect a taking] if it were not tied to the
permit., 7'  For example, in Nollan the Court noted that if the
California Coastal Commission had "simply required the Nollans to
make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a
permanent basis... rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild
their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would
have been a taking." Accordingly, even if a congressional act that
affected the patent right had an essential nexus to a legitimate
government interest, it could still be a taking-the essential nexus test
would simply be irrelevant in a takings case involving a patent.
3. Regulatory Takings
Regulatory takings did not exist until the Supreme Court decided
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. "Prior to Justice Holmes'
66. Id. at 395.
67. Id. at 395-96.
68. See e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 482 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan, 512 U.S. at
374; City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 256 US 687 (1999).
69. Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method Patents and the Fifth Amendment:
Do the New Limits on Enforceability Effect a Taking?, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 147,
168 (1996) (emphasis in original).
70. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (1985) (quoting Johnson &
Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1980)).
71. Brinckerhoff, supra note 69, at 168.
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exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), it
was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct
appropriation of property'... or the functional equivalent of a
'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession.' '' 72 Almost all Supreme
Court regulatory takings cases have involved government action that
affected tangible property tied in some respect to land-coal,73
beachfront lots,74 cedar trees,"' and buildings.76 Nonetheless, by
adjudicating a case in which the plaintiff argued that new federal
pesticide laws effected a taking of trade secrets and then holding that
a taking had occurred, 77 the Court has made it clear that a regulatory
takings claim may arise from government regulation that affects
intellectual property.
The landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal marked the first time
the Court applied the Takings Clause to governmental action that did
not involve an appropriation or physical invasion of property."' In
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court examined the constitutionality of the
Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited coal companies
from mining coal when the removal of the subsurface coal would
cause the buildings above to subside except when the owner of the
coal also owned the surface. 79 After rejecting the argument that the
Kohler Act was necessary to protect public safety, Justice Holmes,
writing for the majority, stated that "if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking."' The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff
coal company, finding that the Kohler Act went "too far" and
therefore effected a taking.8'
Despite the result of Pennsylvania Coal, the Court indicated that
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law," and that "some values are enjoyed under
72. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citations omitted).
73. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
74. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
75. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
76. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
77. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
78. Kendall, supra note 12, at 15 (2000).
79. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412-13.
80. Id. at 415.
81. Id.
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an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. '
Moreover, the Court noted that the regulatory takings analysis
"depend[ed] upon the particular facts" of each case and that courts
must give "[t]he greatest weight.., to the judgment of the
legislature."8
a. The Penn Central Factors
In 1978, Justice Brennan summarized the status of takings law in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City and presented
three factors to be used in a regulatory takings analysis: the economic
impact of the regulation, the extent to which the regulation interfered
with the claimant's "distinct investment-backed expectations," and
the character of the government action.84 A government regulation is
not a taking if it meets all three of the Penn Central factors-in other
words, when the public benefits of the regulation are greater than the
private costs imposed by it, the regulation leaves the property owner
with uses that allow the owner to earn a "reasonable return" on his
"investment-backed expectations," and the benefits of the regulation
85to the public outweigh the burden to the property owner.
When a claimant proves that a government regulation fails at
least one of the Penn Central factors, the regulation is a taking.'4 It is
important to note that, although economic impact is one of the Penn
Central factors, it is also a per se rule: Any regulation that denies all
economically beneficial and productive use of property is a per se
taking.'
i. Economic Impact
Courts have measured the economic impact of a regulation on
property by examining the percentage to which the regulation
82. Id. at 413.
83. Id.
84. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
85. Id.
86. See e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994) ("[T]he burden
properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an
arbitrary regulation of property rights.").
87. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992) (treating equally
"permanent physical occupation' of land" (a per se takings rules) and "regulations that
prohibit all economically beneficial use of land"); see also id. at 1052 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Ultimately even the Court cannot embrace the full implications of its per se
rule.").
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reduces the property's value."8 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, the Supreme Court held that when a regulation deprives or
prohibits the property owner of "all economically viable use" of his
property, the regulation is a taking that requires just compensation.'
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, elaborated on this holding by
stating that "the notion.., that title is somehow held subject to the
'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate all
economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact
recorded in the Takings Clause .... 90 Justice Scalia analogized
extreme property regulation to permanent physical occupation
takings (previously discussed in this Note as being the governmental
action most likely to effect a taking), finding that the "total
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view,
the equivalent of a physical appropriation."9'
According to the Lucas Court, government regulation that
reduces a property's value by ninety-five percent would not
automatically effect a taking under the "all economically viable use"
test.9 The "all economically viable use" per se rule announced in
Lucas "has been narrowly applied, with courts strictly construing the
requirement that the regulation in question deprive the property
owner of all economically viable use of his land."93 In a subsequent
takings decision, the Court wrote, "It is worth noting that Lucas
underscores the difference between physical and regulatory
takings.... For under our physical takings cases it would be
irrelevant whether a property owner maintained five percent of the
value of her property so long as there was a physical appropriation of
any of the parcel." 94 Thus, a governmental action that leaves the
property with some economically viable use may not trigger takings
liability under the Lucas per se rule, but may still trigger takings
liability under the permanent physical occupation rule or the Penn
Central factors.
88. See e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (rejecting takings
claim where property value decreased 75%); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405
(1915) (rejecting takings claim where property value decreased from $800,000 to $60,000 -
i.e., a 92.5% diminution in value).
89. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
90. Id. at 1028.
91. Id. at 1017.
92. Id. at 1019 n.8.
93. Brinckerhoff , supra note 69, at 170.
94. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 330 (2002) n.25.
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ii. Investment-Backed Expectations
The second Penn Central factor is the investment-backed
expectations of the property owner. This factor can be viewed as a
separate factor95 or viewed as a proxy for determining economic
impact. 96 "The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations.""' Whether viewed as a separate factor or as a proxy,
investment-backed expectations are particularly important to patent
holders, because "[t]he encouragement of investment-backed risk is
the fundamental purpose of the patent grant. '
The party challenging the government regulation bears the
burden of showing that the expectations were objectively reasonable;
''a mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a property
interest entitled to protection."'  The party must be mindful of the
Lucas Court's view that investment-backed expectations are different
for personal property than for real property:
[Iln the case of personal property, by reason of the State's
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings,
[the property owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that
new regulation might even render his property economically
worthless (at least if the property's only economically
productive use is sale or manufacture for sale).'
iii. The Character of the Government Regulation
The third Penn Central factor is the character of the government
regulation. "A 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good."' ' This factor may be thought of as a
reiteration of the rule that a governmental action that reduces or
95. Kendall supra note 12 at 24-27.
96. Brinckerhoff, supra note 69, at 172 ("Economic impact is relevant only if it
'interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations."') (quoting Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
97. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
98. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
99. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
100. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (citing Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979).
101. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
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eliminates property rights will most likely not be found to be a taking
when the action seeks to prevent significant harm to the public-the
action does not effect a taking because it is an exercise of the
government's police power.' °2 The Supreme Court observed the
same, finding that "many of [the Court's] prior opinions have
suggested that 'harmful or noxious uses' of property may be
proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of
compensation."10 3
As was the case with the "economic impact" Penn Central factor,
the Lucas opinion analyzes the third Penn Central factor, the
character of the government regulation. "The 'harmful or noxious
uses' principle was the Court's early attempt to describe in theoretical
terms why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause,
affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to
compensate-a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with
respect to the full scope of the State's police power."' 4 The degree to
which a governmental action would comport with the Takings Clause
depended on the government's ability to "identify background
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [the
property owner] now intends in the circumstances in which the
property is presently found."' '° Justice Scalia provided two examples
to further explain the background principles inquiry:
[T]he owner of a lake-bed, for example, would not be entitled
to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to
engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of
flooding others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear
generating plant, when it is directed to remove all
improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits
astride an earthquake fault."°
In these two examples, even if the regulations eliminate "the
land's only economically productive use""' the character of the
governmental actions satisfies the third Penn Central factor and
therefore does not effect a taking. "The use of these properties for
what are now expressly prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and
(subject to other constitutional limitations) it was open to the State at
102. See supra note 15; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
103. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1021.
104. Id. at 1023.
105. Id. at 1031.
106. Id. at 1029.
107. Id. at 1030.
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any point to make the implication of those background principles of
nuisance and property law explicit. '
Since the Court deemed the background principles inquiry to be
"the logically antecedent inquiry,"'" it is the first step of a takings
analysis. As the logically antecedent inquiry, it trumps the two per se
rules of takings liability, permanent physical occupation and denial of
all economically viable use. If, under the background-principles
inquiry, a court finds that the property owner never fully or freely
possessed the property right alleged to have been taken, then no
taking has occurred regardless of whether further inquiry would show
that the government permanently physically occupied the property,
and/or deprived the property owner of all economically viable use of
the property.
III. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing of a patented invention is "[a] statutorily
created license that allows certain people to pay a royalty and use an
invention without the patentee's permission. '" 0 The U.S. Patent Act
does not contain a general compulsory licensing provision."
Congress, however, has authorized compulsory licensing "for
preventing air pollution, public health purposes, government use,
atomic energy, aerospace, and national security. '" 2 For example, the
Atomic Energy Act compels patentees to license atomic energy
inventions,"' the Clean Air Act compels patentees to license air
pollution control inventions, 14 and the Plant Variety Protection Act
compels patentees to license new varieties of sexually reproduced
plants."5 Most compulsory licensing provisions require the licensee to
pay "reasonable royalt[ies]" to the patent holder."6  In addition,
United States patent law effectively entitles the federal government
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1027.
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004).
111. See generally 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 2005) (absence of any provision that
would compel a patentee to license its patent to a private third party); see also Grace K.
Avedissian, Comment, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward
Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism," 18 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 237, 253 (2002-2003).
112. Avedissian, supra note 111 at 101; see also note 16, supra.
113. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2183(c), (g) (West 2005).
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7608 (West 2005).
115. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2404 (West 2005).
116. See generally note 16, supra.
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to a compulsory license on any patented technology it sees fit to
exploit by limiting a patent holder's remedy against unlicensed use or
manufacture by the United States government to "the recovery of his
reasonable and entire compensation for such [unlicensed] use and
manufacture."
117
IV. Redefinition of Patentable Subject Matter
Ordinarily, 35 U.S.C. section 101 and federal case law determine
the boundaries of patentable subject matter. Nonetheless, Congress
has previously enacted legislation that has redefined what can and
cannot be patented. Two examples of Congressional redefinition are
the Invention Secrecy Act"8 and the Atomic Energy Act."9
The Invention Secrecy Act affects patents that "might... be
detrimental to the national security."' 20 Normally, when a patent is
issued, the PTO simultaneously publishes the patent application,
thereby making publicly available the details of the invention. That is
the tradeoff of the patent system: The patentee receives exclusive
rights to the invention for twenty years and the public gains detailed
knowledge of the invention. In fact, a patent must include
information that would "enable any person skilled in the art to which
[the invention] pertains ... to make and use" the invention. 2'
The Invention Secrecy Act affects two types of patents: patents
on "invention[s] in which the Government has a property interest"
and those "in which the Government does not have a property
interest.''22 For the former type of patent, when publication of the
application might, "in the opinion of the head of the interested
Government agency, be detrimental to the national security, the
Commissioner of Patents... shall order that the invention be kept
secret and shall withhold the publication of the application or the
grant of a patent therefor.' '123  For the latter type, when the
Commissioner believes that publication of the patent application
might be "detrimental to the national security, [the Commissioner]
shall make the application for patent.., available for inspection to
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of Defense, and the
117. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498(a) (West 2005).
118. 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2005).
119. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2181 (West 2005).
120. 35 U.S.C.A. § 181. (West 2001).
121. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2005).
122. 35 U.S.C.A. § 181. (West 2001).
123. Id.
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chief officer of any other department or agency of the Government
designated by the President as a defense agency of the United
States. 124  In both situations, a government official may issue a
secrecy order and withhold the grant of a patent.15 A secrecy order
prohibits the inventor from publishing or disclosing any material
information relating to the invention12 "It then becomes a criminal
offense for private persons, knowing of the order and without
authorization, to publish or disclose the invention or material
information respecting it. 1 7 The affected patent applicant "shall
have a right to appeal from the order to the Secretary of
Commerce."'" The secrecy order and patent withholding may last for
at most for one year, and may be renewed as often as necessary.
129
The Commissioner may rescind the secrecy order and patent
withholding when "the publication or disclosure of the invention is no
longer deemed detrimental to the national security" by the "the heads
of the departments and the chief officers of the agencies who caused
the order to be issued."'3 ° (It may interest the reader to note that
4,942 secrecy orders are in effect as of the end of fiscal year 2006.13)
The Atomic Energy Act declares, "No patent shall issue for any
invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of
special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon. '
Accordingly, it is like the Invention Secrecy Act in that it keeps a
class of patents from issuing. The Atomic Energy Act goes further
than the Invention Secrecy Act, however, by revoking existing patent
rights on any patent granted for an "invention or discovery.., used in
the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in atomic
weapons."'33  Such patents "are revoked to the extent that such
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 182, 186 (West 2005).
127. Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 240 (Ct.Cl. 1980) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 186).
128. 35 U.S.C.A. § 181. (West 2001).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Letter from Robert Fawcett, Program Analyst, Office of General Counsel, United
States Patent and Trademark Office, to Steven Aftergood, Director, Project on
Government Secrecy, Federation of American Scientists (Oct. 22, 2004) available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/stats.pdf.
132. 42 U.S.C.A § 2181(a) (West 2000).
133. Id. at § 2181(b).
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invention or discovery is so used, and just compensation shall be
made therefore."'
34
V. Exemptions of Enumerated Classes or Activities from
Patent Infringement
Certain congressional acts have exempted classes of people or
activities from patent infringement. The Medical Activity Act of
1996, for example, exempted from patent infringement medical
practitioners and related health care entities who used patented
medical procedures.'35 Congress passed the Medical Activity Act of
1996 in response to a lawsuit alleging that an ophthalmologist had
violated a patent on a technique for cataract surgery,"6 the first action
in the United States that enforced a medical procedure patent against
a physician.'37
The Hatch-Waxman Act modified, among other things, the
definition of infringement by providing that activities are not
infringing if they are "solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates... drugs or veterinary biological products.' '38  All
drug manufacturers must obtain regulatory approval from the Food
& Drug Administration (FDA) for their drugs before they can
market the drugs to consumers in the United States.'39 Before
passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug manufacturer
infringed a patent when it used a patented drug as a necessary
condition to gaining approval from the FDA for its generic version. "
Moreover, because the generic drug manufacturer could not begin the
FDA approval process until the patent expired, the branded drug
134. Id.
135. Medical Activity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (West 2005)).
136. Pallin v. Singer, No. 5:93-202, 1995 WL 608365 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).
137. See Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection
Act in Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 123 n.120 (2005);
William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 651, 653 (1995); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal
Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1176 (1999).
138. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e)(1) (West 2003).
139. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-395 (West 2005).
140. See Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (discussing a branded drug manufacturer that sued a generic drug manufacturer,
where the court held that limited use of a patented drug, even though made solely to
obtain FDA approval, was infringement).
manufacturer had in effect an extension on the term of its patent
equal to the length of the FDA approval process-a process that
takes 8.2 years on average. 4' As a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a
generic drug manufacturer can now legally obtain regulatory approval
before the expiration of the branded drug's patent and sell its version
of the drug as soon as the patent expires. It is important to note that
one provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, codified at 35 U.S.C.
section 156, extends the patent terms of products subject to FDA
approval if the patentee can meet certain requirements.42 Thus, for
example, the initial developer of a new drug is not penalized by the
shortened patent term caused by a prolonged FDA approval process
that prevented the drug developer from marketing the drug for the





Under compulsory licensing schemes, Congress removes from
the patentee's "bundle of rights" the right to exclude because the
patentee is unable to enjoin the infringer's use of the patent.
Compulsory licenses can be analogized to compulsory easements
across the patentee's intellectual property: The government forbids
the patentee (the property owner) from excluding others from the
property by prohibiting the patentee from turning anyone away who
pays a reasonable fee.
Even if these reasonable royalties amount to just compensation,
compulsory licensing schemes constitute permanent "intellectual"
occupations, akin to the permanent physical occupation found by the
Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.'"
In Loretto, a New York statute barred any property owner from
interfering with the installation of cable television facilities or from
demanding payment of more than one dollar from any cable
television operator.1 4 5  In essence, the government permanently
barred the plaintiff from excluding from the roof of her apartment
building the government or any entities which had the government's
141. ROGER SCHECTER & JOHN THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 286 (2d ed.
2004).
142. 35 U.S.C.A. § 156(a) (West 2005).
143. Schecter, supra note 141, at 286.
144. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
145. Id. at 423.
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permission to occupy the roof. The Court noted the irrelevance of
identity of the occupant: "A permanent physical occupation
authorized by state law is a taking without regard to whether the
State, or instead a party authorized by the State, is the occupant."'"
Despite the fact that a roof comprises only a fraction of the surface
area of an apartment building, the Court held that the installation and
presence of cables on the plaintiff's roof constituted a permanent
occupation by the State that effected a taking.147 Indeed, the Court
made it clear that "constitutional protection for the rights of private
property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area
permanently occupied.'
48
Similarly, even though a compulsory license may only amount to
an occupation of a fraction of the "surface area" of a patent, such
occupation permanently bars the patentee from excluding from the
affected "surface area" the government or any entities which have the
government's permission to occupy the intellectual property. The
Loretto Court noted that "the owner suffers a special kind of injury
when a stranger invades and occupies the owner's property,', 49 and
that such an invasion "is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps
any other category of property regulation. '"'5
To be fair, there are two features that distinguish a taking that
results from a compulsory license and the taking found in Loretto: (1)
The property occupied by a compulsory license is intellectual
property, while in Loretto the property was real property, and (2)
while it is unlikely that a compulsory license will empty the patent of
any value, the Loretto Court observed of the plaintiff that "though
the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied
space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a
stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the
purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property.
''51
These distinguishing features, however, do not rescue compulsory
licensing schemes from takings liability.
It is possible to apply the constructive permanent physical
occupation rule to patents, as discussed in Section II.C.1, supra. In a
nutshell, the Court has consistently been highly protective of the right
146. Id. at 432, n.9.
147. Id. at 421, 441.
148. Id. at 436.
149. Id. at 420 (emphasis in original).
150. Id. at 441.
151. Id. at 436.
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to exclude and has found takings where the government has
permanently abridged a property owner's right to exclude. The
Loretto decision was thusly predicated on protecting property owners
from permanent occupations of their property.
A patent gives the patent holder the right to prevent others from
making, using, selling, offering to sell, and importing the protected
invention.52 A patent does not affirmatively allow the patentee a
right to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import the invention; it only
grants the patentee the right to exclude others from doing so."'
It does not matter that a compulsory license does not prevent the
patentee from using his patent in other ways or is only an occupation
of a fraction of the intellectual property. As the Supreme Court has
emphasized, "Our cases establish that even a 'minimal permanent
physical occupation of real property' requires compensation under
the [Takings] Clause.""' 4 The compulsory license constitutes a
permanent occupation of the patentee's property. The compulsory
license bars the patentee from excluding any would-be licensees.
Allowing the government to permanently occupy a patent through a
compulsory license would "seriously undermine[]" "'the express
purpose of the Constitution and Congress[] to promote the progress
of the useful arts.'
155
It is highly unlikely that compulsory licensing statutes effect
unlawful takings because such statutes purport to be for the public
benefit and generally require reasonable royalties. As a result, if any
compulsory licensing scheme is a taking, it is most likely a valid taking
because it satisfies the public use and just compensation requirements
of the Takings Clause-but these compulsory licensing provisions are
takings nonetheless.
B. Redefinition of Patentable Subject Matter
Congress, which has the constitutional authority to grant patents,
may redefine what is and is not patentable subject matter. Two
examples of such redefinition are found in the Atomic Energy Act
and the Invention Secrecy Act.
152. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2005).
153. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947, 949-50 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
154. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at
427).
155. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 U.S. 594, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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Looking at just the text of the Invention Secrecy Act,5 6 which
does not specifically enumerate intellectual property prohibited by
background principles, 7 the Act effects a taking for any patent
applications within the scope of the Act, whether the patent
application was pending at the time the Act was enacted or was
pending after it was enacted. To reiterate, the Invention Secrecy Act
affects patents that are the subject of patent applications; it authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, when "publication or
disclosure of the invention by the grant of a patent might be
detrimental to the national security, to order that the invention be
kept secret and to withhold the grant of a patent so long as the
national interest requires."'58
"[A] secrecy order... weighs very heavily toward finding a
compensable taking."'' 9 The Act deprives a patent applicant of a
patent to which he otherwise would have been entitled, but does so in
order to protect the national security. Thus, it meets the public use
requirement of the Takings Clause. The Act also provides two routes
for affected patent applicants to seek just compensation. "Court
determinations of what constitutes 'just compensation' under section
183 [the Invention Secrecy Act] are rare," however.' 6' In one of those
rare determinations, Constant v. United States, the Court of Claims
stated that "[t]he core of the legislation is recovery of all 'damage
caused by the order of secrecy and/or for the use of the invention
by the Government.
' ' '161
That the Invention Secrecy Act provides a monetary remedy for
affected patent applicants strongly suggests that the Act provides
adequate recourse for patent applicants seeking just compensation.
As a result, the Act meets the public use and just compensation
requirements of the Takings Clause. Because the government may,
pursuant to the Invention Secrecy Act, withhold a patent and do so
for an indefinite amount of time, the Act effects a taking for any
invention which is not prohibited by background principles. For
156. 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2001); see also discussion supra Section IV, from supra
note 119 to supra note 134.
157. The term "background principles" used here and throughout this Note refers to
the "background principles" described in Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; see also supra discussion
accompanying notes 104-107.
158. Constant, 617 F.2d 239, 239-40 (Ct. CI. 1980) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 181).
159. Sabing H. Lee, Protecting the Private Inventor under the Peacetime Provisions of
the Invention Secrecy Act, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 345,407 (1997).
160. Id. at 368.
161. Constant, 617 F.2d at 243, n.10.
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example, the invention involved in Constant was "a method of
encoding radar signals."'62  It does not seem to be prohibited by
background principles of law; that the secrecy order imposed on the
invention was rescinded after fifteen months"3 also suggests that the
invention violated no background principles. Accordingly, the
invention was subject to a governmental taking for fifteen months and
the inventor deserved just compensation.
Patents affected by the Atomic Energy Act in general have not
been subjected to a taking because much of the intellectual property
expressly enumerated in the statute is prohibited or highly regulated
by background principles of law. To reiterate, the Atomic Energy
Act states, "No patent shall hereafter be granted issue for any
invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of
special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.
' 61
The Atomic Energy Act also revokes existing patent rights on any
patent granted for an "invention or discovery.., used in the
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in atomic
weapons."
165
As stated in the Lucas opinion, the background principles
inquiry is the first step in a takings analysis;' 66 under a background
principles inquiry, anything "which is useful solely in the utilization of
special nuclear material or atomic energy in atomic weapons" is
almost certainly prohibited or heavily regulated under existing
background principles. For example, in the realm of non-weapon
"nuclear material or atomic energy," the government may, without
triggering takings liability, order the owner of a nuclear generating
plant to "remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that
the plant sits astride an earthquake fault.'
' 67
A D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case, decided several decades
before Lucas, found that governmental action pursuant to the Act
effected a taking: "Under the Atomic Energy Act the Government
exercised its constitutional power of eminent domain. In the exercise
of that power, it is required to render just compensation."'
162. Id. at 240.
163. Id.
164. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2181(a); see also supra note 132.
165. Id. at § 2181(b); see also supra note 133.
166. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); see also supra note 109.
167. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032.
168. N. V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 316 F.2d 401,
407 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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Nonetheless, under the "logically antecedent" background principles
inquiry presented in Lucas, 69 an illustration for which specifically
indicated that condemnation of a nuclear generating plant sitting on a
earthquake fault would not be a taking, it is "open to the State at any
point to make the implication of those background principles of
nuisance and property law explicit." As a result, the government may
pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act withhold the grant of patents and
revoke issued patents without triggering takings liability. For
example, the government certainly has the power, under background
principles, to protect citizens from risks of atomic radiation. Some of
the risks were recently listed by the D.C. Circuit: "At massive levels,
radiation exposure can cause sudden death. At lower doses, radiation
can have devastating health effects, including increased cancer risks
and serious birth defects such as mental retardation, eye
malformations, and small brain or head size."17 If the government
may constitutionally act, under background principles, to control
nuclear energy and nuclear waste, then a fortiori the government may
constitutionally control via the Atomic Energy Act inventions that
are "useful solely in the utilization of" or "used in the utilization of"
atomic weapons."'
In addition, because atomic energy is a field that has been
heavily regulated by the legislative and executive branches,"' patent
applicants and patent holders will have a harder time proving to a
court that their investment-backed expectations were reasonable or
that the governmental action interfered with those expectations.
"In a heavily regulated field... the standard for finding
reasonableness in investment-backed expectations is higher than in
largely deregulated activities."'74
In sum, governmental abrogation or abridgement, pursuant to
the Atomic Energy Act, of patent applications and existing patents
does not effect a taking.
169. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
170. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (internal citations omitted).
171. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2181(a), (b) (West 2005).
172. Id. at §§ 1258-61 (chronicling the history of federal regulation of nuclear waste).
173. See also 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 2005) (discussed infra note 187).
174. John C. O'Quinn, Protecting Private Intellectual Property From Government
Intrusion: Revisiting SmithKline and the Case for Just Compensation, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 435,
500 (2002).
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C. Exemptions of Enumerated Classes or Activities from Patent
Infringement
The takings analysis is slightly more complicated for patent
holders whose patents are subject to regulation such as the Hatch-
Waxman Act or the Medical Activity Amendment, which provide
infringement exemptions. Statutes that provide infringement
exemptions typically state some public purpose and therefore almost
certainly meet the public use requirement of the takings clause. The
Medical Activity Act of 1996 states that a primary goal of the
Amendment is to contain medical costs by allowing doctors to
practice patented medical procedures without paying royalties or
bearing the costs of infringement litigation."5 The Hatch-Waxman
Act aims to hasten the introduction of generic medicines to the
market by allowing companies to sell generic medicines as soon as the
patent on the branded medicine has expired.
The Medical Activity Act of 1996, for example, exempted from
patent infringement medical practitioners and related health care
entities who used patented medical procedures. 176 "The effective
result of the statute is that while medical methods remain statutory
subject matter, a proprietor cannot enforce a medical method patent
against those parties most likely to infringe it. 177
The essence of a patent is that it grants to the holder the legal
right to exclude -"universally held to be a fundamental element of
the property right. 1 78 A patent only grants to the patent holder the
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing the subject of the patent; it does not grant an affirmative
rights. 79  Accordingly, when a patent no longer confers upon the
owner the legally enforceable right to exclude those most likely to
practice the patented invention, the regulation severely reduces the
economically viable use of the patent. A patent constrained by a
statute like the Medical Activity Amendment can easily lose greater
than ninety-five percent of its value. Patents do not have as many
economically viable uses as land. For example:
Land required to be left in its natural state may retain value
because it might be purchased by (1) neighboring owners to
175. 142 Cong. Rec. S12,023-24 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Frist).
176. Medical Activity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (West 2005)).
177. Schecter, supra note 141, at 40.
178. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
179. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947, 949-50 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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enlarge their lots or protect their view; (2) land speculators
hoping the restrictions will be lifted someday; (3) conservancy
groups to guard against the possibility that the restrictions
might be lifted; or (4) other who could use the property in its
natural state, perhaps as a campground, grazing area, or hunting
preserve.
That is not the case for patent holders, however, who have a
much narrower range of economically viable uses. A patent, as a
license to exclude, gives patentees two economically viable uses that
would not be available in the absence of some form of legally
conferred intellectual property protection such as copyright,
trademark, or patent: royalty fees and infringement damages. 1' (A
third economically viable use for a patent, which is more of a negative
benefit to a patent holder, arises when companies seek and/or derive
a competitive advantage by owning one or more patents, thereby
preventing competitors from using or selling the patented invention
or inventions.)
In finding no takings liability, courts have suggested ways in
which a property might still have economically viable use. In
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, the Court upheld a city ordinance prohibiting
the operation of a brickyard within Los Angeles city limits.'2 In
evaluating the impact of the regulation, the Court noted that while
the regulation kept Hadacheck from making bricks on his property, it
did not deprive him of all economically viable use of his property
because it did not keep him from removing the brick clay from his
property and making the bricks elsewhere. 83 If a court can suggest
ways in which the holder of a medical procedure patent can still make
economically viable use of his property, then it is almost certain that
the court will find no takings liability. Nonetheless, given the nature
of the patented medical procedure and the field to which the
procedure belongs, it is unrealistic for any economically viable use to
remain once Congress has exempted medical practitioners from
infringement liability.
Alternatively, the Medical Activity Amendment, by allowing
infringement of patents, could be a permanent physical occupation,
under the rule set forth in Loretto. 8'  The Medical Activity
180. Kendall, supra note 12, at 196.
181. See, e.g., Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 No.
1 INTELL. PROP, L. BULL. 1 (2005).
182. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
183. Id. at 411-12.
184. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Amendment defines an entire class of people whom patent holders
cannot exclude from practicing their inventions, '85 forcing a medical
method patent holder to endure "occupations" of its patent.
Moreover, this occupation is not temporary, but endures for the
entire term of the patent." The result of applying the permanent
physical occupation rule to the Medical Activity Amendment is that it
effects a taking for which the government must justly compensate the
patent holder.
There is one important and perhaps dispositive countervailing
consideration: If the field (or "art," to use the language of the Patent
Act 87) in which the invention exists is subject to constant and/or
heavy governmental regulation, a patentee whose patent is subject to
unfavorable legislation most likely does not have a successful takings
claim because a court would determine that the patentee adjusted his
investment-backed expectations in light of the regulation."8 Such is
the case for pharmaceuticals, which are subject to the Hatch-Waxman
Act: "In a heavily regulated field (such as pharmaceuticals) the
standard for finding reasonableness in investment-backed
expectations is higher than in largely deregulated activities. ' 89
The diminution of the patent right by a regulation like the
Hatch-Waxman Act would not be a regulatory taking because "it
must be acknowledged that the pharmaceutical industry is one of the
most heavily regulated of any industry in modern commerce, and that
government alterations in regulatory schemes come with the territory
of doing business in the market."'" The property owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations are a critical factor: In Pennsylvania
Coal, the Supreme Court found that no taking had occurred since the
surface owners in the case had knowingly acquired the surface rights
without the mineral estate and had expressly assumed the risk that
mining might damage their property.9
185. 35 U.S.C.A. § 287(c) (West 2005).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 2005) (denying patentability "if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.").
188. O'Quinn, supra note 174; John C. Yoo, Takings Issues in the Approval of Generic
Biologics, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 33,43 (2005).
189. O'Quinn, supra note 174.
190. Yoo, supra note 188.
191. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.393, 412 (1922).
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Timing is a factor as well: A takings claim by patentee would
be slightly stronger if the relevant legislation was enacted after
the patentee submitted its patent application. Under a court's "ad
hoc, factual inquir[y],"1" it would be more likely to find that the
legislation altered the patent applicant's reasonable investment-
backed expectations than if the legislation was enacted prior to
submission of the patent application.
"The encouragement of investment-based risk is the
fundamental purpose of the patent grant,"'1 93 and as a result, any
governmental action that interferes with the patentee or potential
patentee's investment-backed expectations carries with it potential
takings liability. However, factors such as (1) historical and/or
existing government regulation in the field and (2) timing have been
viewed by courts as factors which lower the patentee's investment-
backed expectations such that the governmental action does not
effect a taking.
VI. Conclusion
The question of what constitutes a taking has caused the courts
great difficulty. Judicial answers to the question are not altogether in
harmony." The Supreme Court has established several principles,
rules, and tests but has confessed that beyond the more obvious cases
that fall under the per se rules, takings analyses are "essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries."'1 95 The Court's jurisprudence is detailed and
developed enough, however, to give Congress, the courts, patent
holders, and patent applicants a firm starting point from which to
determine when legislation has gone "too far" and effected a taking
of intellectual property in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Such constitutional concern deserves consideration,
given the fundamental changes proposed in the Patent Reform Act of
2005,'96 the increasing backlog and number of applications received by
192. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
193. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
194. WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2918 (2005).
195. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
196. Steve Seidenberg, A Sea Change in Patent Law: Proposed Legislation Would
Wean the United States from a "First to Invent" Approval System, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2006, at
49.
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the Patent and Trademark Office,"" and the evolving metes and
bounds of technology and law.
197. See, e.g., Kelly D. Talcott, The "Limited Patent," N.Y.L.J., Feb. 21, 2006, at 5
("[Tihe current reported patent application backlog [is] in excess of 600,000, and
application pendency periods stretch[] to three and four years-sometimes longer .... ).
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